Bannockburn 1314: Robert Bruce's Great Victory
By Pete Armstrong Paperback (Osprey Campaign) £9.79 / $12.89
The full story surrounding the battle that represented the climax of the career of King Robert the Bruce, and has since remained the most famous battle in Scottish history - the Battle of Bannockburn. In 1307 King Edward I of England, "The Hammer of the Scots" and William Wallace's nemesis, died at Burgh-on-Sands. His son, Edward II, was not from the same mould; incorrigibly idle and apathetic, he refused to take on the burdens of kingship, surrounding himself with favourites. The Scots under Robert the Bruce now had a chance to recover from the grievous punishment Edward I had inflicted upon them. By 1313 Bruce had capture every English-held castle bar Stirling. Faced with the complete collapse of the English position in Scotland even Edward II had no choice but to respond.
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Product Details
ISBN: 9781855326095
Publisher: Osprey
Publication Date: 31 March 2002
Format: Paperback
Language: English
Pages: 96 p.
Customer Reviews
Average Customer Review 
Osprey Campaign series, March 12, 2008
By Douglas E. Libert "howitt" (parkersburg wv)
Part of the Osprey campaign series,this one focuses on one of the conflicts in the longrunning conflict between England and Scotland,a north versus south territorial/political dispute that extends over a period of centuries.Not until the 20th century and a ton of social legislation which makes it worthwhile for the Scots to put down the sword,does this on/off again sporadic conflict end.Bannockburn 1314, is one of the more memorable flare-ups between the "English and the "Scots".
Edward II,the English king appears to lack the leadership qualities necessary to win this campaign against Scotland in 1314.This is how I interpreted the authors' writing.On the other hand,King Robert I(known as Robert the Bruce)knows all the tricks including how to immobilize the English army by trapping pieces of Edwards grand army in the marshy bogs and soaking wet terrain.According to Armstrong,Edward II was never able to bring but a fragment of his troops into battle.It seemed the English strategy was to show more personal courage and hope this factor to overcome the Scots.Unfortunately for the English,the Scots were just as brave and had alot more "tools" to use,if not the manpower. The result was a disaster for Edward II and he was almost personally captured twice during this campaign and a follow-up one.
There are lots of color plates illustrating the uniforms and equipment of both sides.The portraits are made in context to dramatic points in the conflict so the reader gets to see both the equipment used and great displays of Action.As always maps galore and timetable overviews as well as marches to and from Bannockburn.In the case of Edwards' army a speedy march from Bannockburn. This book doesn't however give alot of politics,the last minute,"side-changers",Scots who welcome the English, or English not at all saddened by Edward losing his skin.
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Not enough horrlicks for some Scottish nationalists, 31 Jul 2007
By J. May (Luton (just north of London), UK)
Just started reading this book, but the above review is nonsense- the authur sets out an order of battle (page 43), which gives approx 14,000 in the English army and 8,000-10,000 for the Scots.
Neither figure is what could be called controversial or wildly different from other modern accounts, expect maybe for Mel Gibson and fellow travellers.
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A fine companion to Stirling Bridge 1297, 1 Jun 2007
By E. Lindsay
Definately a fine bed time read with Horlicks if you are of English chauvenist persuasion and you need a little comforting before getting to sleep while pondering an English disaster.
Like the companion book in the series on Stirling Bridge the authors bias comes through and the now fashionable (though unconvincing) attempt to play down numbers of English involved, and gloss over English losses comes through as the prime reason for this book having been put into print in the first place.
Scottish forces receive a reverse treatment in being increased in size though the author makes little factual justification for this or indeed appears to have made little worthwhile investigation on this matter at all.
With depressing inevitability books both end in a one sided bed time feel good factor (if you are English) by revelling in the (allegedly) minor affairs Scottish victories were while what holocaust blood-baths Scottish defeats were. Theres much better coverage available out there on both subjects notwithstanding the standard Osprey thin book format.
Too partisan, give them a miss.
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An Excellent Campaign Summary, May 12, 2002
By R. A Forczyk (Laurel, MD USA)
Pete Armstrong, a British artist and model-builder, has written an excellent campaign summary of Scotland's greatest military victory, the Battle of Bannockburn in 1314. Although some of the exact details of this famous battle remain open to debate, Armstrong does a fair job in presenting a balanced campaign narrative that incorporates different viewpoints. Bannockburn is also enhanced by excellent artwork and maps, which help to bring the battle into sharp focus. All in all, this is one of the better Osprey Campaign series titles.
In accordance with standard Osprey Campaign series format, Bannockburn 1314 begins with short sections on the origins of the campaign (8 pages), a campaign chronology, opposing commanders, opposing armies and opposing plans. The section on armies details the infantry and cavalry formations of both sides and the author stresses that while the English had superior cavalry, their failure to employ combined arms tactics utilizing both infantry and cavalry was a fundamental flaw in their numerically superior army. Certainly combined arms tactics are sound advice in any period, but while the author points out the English failure in this regard, he fails to point out how the Scottish were any different. If the English were overly reliant on their cavalry, the Scots were certainly overly reliant on spear-armed infantry. The Scots had no answer to the English superior quality and quantity in archers, and this had led to the defeat at Falkirk 16 years before. The section on plans notes that the English King Edward II was well provided with intelligence about the enemy as well as supplies, but had no real plan of campaign other than to relieve the siege of Stirling Castle. Edward's lack of combat experience and his assumption that the Scots would disperse in the face of a major English invasion are cited as primary causes of his negligent planning. Again, while the author's assessment of deficient English planning appears correct, it is hard to see that the Scottish King Robert the Bruce had any serious plan of campaign either. Until the second day of battle, the Scots kept their options open to fight or flee and their victory was the result of opportunity, rather than planning.
The campaign narrative itself is 38 pages long and is enhanced by five 2-D maps (Scotland in 1314, Edward II's invasion, the flight of the English army, Scottish raids in northern England, Bannockburn then and now) and three 3-D "Birds Eye View" maps (the fighting on 23 June 1314, the Scottish attack and the collapse of the English army). There are also three excellent battle scenes: the encounter between Robert the Bruce and Henry de Bohun, the attack of the Earl of Gloucester's cavalry on a Scottish schiltron and Edward II's flight). A somewhat longer than usual 20-page section on the battle's aftermath covers casualties, reasons for the English defeat, results of the battle, the continuation of the English-Scot war and changes in military tactics because of the battle. Indeed, the author should be applauded for finding space for some analysis of the battle. Essentially, the author blames most of the defeat upon Edward II's atrocious lack of leadership and faulty decisions, which was certainly a key ingredient in the disaster. Coupled to Edward's poor leadership, Robert the Bruce's ability to boldly seize opportunity presented by English indecision and confusion resulted in a successful Scottish counterattack on the second day. Rather than merely blaming one individual, I think it might be fairer to say that English arrogance was to blame for the defeat, since this same kind of arrogance figured in other battles where professional English armies opposed irregulars (e.g. the American Revolution, the Zulus, the Boers). Inexperienced as he was, Edward II probably would have entered battle more cautiously if opposing a professional continental foe like the French or Spanish. The author does conclude that the English eventually learned at great cost to deal with Scottish tactics and that they put this to good use against the French in the Hundred Years War.
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